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ABSTRACT 
Based on Pritchard’s distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic 
grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I 
present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably 
motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of 
phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë’s actionist account of perceptual 
consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because 
it is a form of embodied achievement – what I call embodied rationality –, which offers a way of 
dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly 
counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in 
a radical skeptical scenario. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1. Favoring and Discriminating Epistemic Grounds 
 
Disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is not an orthodoxical view: 
contrary to modern philosophical tradition, one of its main tenets is that 
perception is sometimes factive and that non-factive states do not have the 
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same epistemic status as perception. Alternatively, a disjunctivist might say 
that there is no epistemic common-level between perception in paradigmatic 
cases and non-perceptive states, like dreams, hallucinations and illusions. 
The view is especially relevant against a variation of skeptical argument that 
hinges on the idea that our experience does not give us a rational basis for 
believing mundane proposition instead of skeptical hypotheses1. When 
dealing with skepticism, therefore, factivity is not enough: an interesting 
version of epistemological disjunctivism has to claim that perception is a 
factive rational basis for holding beliefs about the external world (at least in 
paradigmatic cases)2. Henceforth, I will assume the correctness of 
epistemological disjunctivism. 
In order to advance the view without committing it with the seemingly 
absurd consequence that we have rational grounds to discriminate between 
actual possibilities – say, that there is a goldfinch yonder – and the relevant 
skeptical hypotheses – e.g., that I am an envatted brain hallucinating a 
goldfinch – Pritchard (2012, 2016) introduces an independently motivated 
distinction between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds. Imagine 
I hold an apple and form the belief that it is a pacific rose apple (p). An 
interlocutor could ask me how I know it. With this she could mean how I 
know that p obtains instead of its being a red delicious apple (q). This 
possibility is a close one, and it seems that I must be able to discriminate a 
pacific rose apple from a red delicious apple in order to know that p 
perceptually. Things start to get interesting if we consider local skeptical 
possibilities. Imagine my interlocutor asks me how I know that it is a pacific 
rose apple instead of a perfectly manufactured counterfeit apple (r). If this 
possibility is reasonably well-motivated3 – if we are both well aware that 
                                               
1 Brueckner (1994) is responsible for bringing this argument, which is now known 
as the underdetermination skeptical argument, to the contemporary epistemological 
debate. 
2 I am using Pritchard’s (2012) formulation, but other philosophers - such as 
Hinton (1967) and McDowell (1982, 2011) - express disjunctivist ideas differently. 
See Haddock and Macpherson (2008) for the differences between the varieties of 
disjunctivism.  
3 ‘Reasonably’ here means ‘to be appropriately supported by reasons’. Moreover, as 
it will become clear in §4, I am not using ‘reasonably’ and ‘rationally’ 
interchangeably. 
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counterfeit apples are abundant in this area, for instance – then my initial 
belief that p was temerarious and does not amount to knowledge, for I 
would be unable to discriminate p from r just from looking. In order to 
know that p obtains, then, maybe I would need to smell the putative apple, 
feel its texture more attentively, weight it and so on, which means I would 
need to appeal to accessible discriminating evidence. It is entirely another 
matter if r is not reasonably well-motivated. If there is no particular reason 
to suppose that r could be the case – if my interlocutor asks me out of the 
blue how do I know that p because r just could be the case – then there is no 
need to discriminate between p and r from obtaining. Favoring epistemic 
grounds (such as my current perception and my background knowledge) are 
enough to support the belief that p over r if r lacks a reasonable motivation4.  
The crux of the matter, argues Pritchard, is that radical skeptical 
possibilities, such as being a brain in vat, are necessarily reasonably 
unmotivated, for there is no particular reason that could be adduced in its 
support (Pritchard, 2016, p. 141). A skeptic would not (indeed, could not) 
claim that there is some evidence that supports the possibility that we are 
envatted brains, for this would be self-defeating. Neither there are accessible 
discriminating evidences one could discover to rule out radical skeptical 
possibilities like this one, for such possibilities supposedly undermine all of 
our putative knowledge at once – that is precisely what makes them radical. 
However, the epistemological disjunctivist is in a position to say that the 
propositions we come to believe everyday do enjoy favoring (non-
discriminating) epistemic support over radical skeptical possibilities, since 
our perception is a factive rational basis for believing. Now, the putative 
problem of epistemic immodesty arises if we join this view with the closure 
principle for rationally grounded knowledge – namely: 
                                               
4 This is analogous to the famous zebra case originally found in Dretske (1970): one 
sees a zebra in the zoo, but if there are available reasons to suppose that it might be 
a cleverly disguised mule, then one’s epistemic position is surely undermined. In this 
case, one needs discriminative evidence to dismiss the possibility that it might be a 
cleverly disguised mule. However, if this possibility is not properly motivated, then 
one’s epistemic position qualifies at least prima facie to knowledge.  
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If S rationally knows that p and S competently deduces q from p, forming 
a belief in q and retaining the rationally grounded knowledge that p, then S 
rationally knows that q.5 
This principle enjoys some intuitive plausibility; it does not look like we 
could reject it with impunity. Moreover, epistemological disjunctivism per se 
offers no ground for the rejection of the principle, which is indeed an 
advantage of the view. If we combine epistemological disjunctivism with 
this closure principle, it follows that we can acquire rationally grounded 
knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses. That we know in a 
rationally grounded way (even if not discriminatively) that we are not brains 
in vats, for instance, is what Pritchard takes to be a case of epistemic immodesty. 
He writes: 
 
[…] If the epistemological disjunctivist extends her anti-skeptical line 
to this form of radical skepticism [closure-based radical skepticism] 
by contending that we can have rationally grounded knowledge of 
the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, then it can look like an 
unduly strong response to the problem of radical skepticism […] 
Epistemological disjunctivism, so construed, seems committed to 
embracing a kind of epistemic immodesty, in that intuitively we are 
unable to have rationally grounded knowledge of these propositions 
[denials of radical skeptical hypotheses]. (Pritchard, 2016, p. 179-180) 
 
Epistemic immodesty consists in the possibility of acquiring rationally 
grounded knowledge – as opposed to mere externalist knowledge – of the 
denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, which seems to be a case of 
dogmatism. On a conception of rationality according to which to be 
epistemically rational implies to possess available reasons to believe (a 
conception we will challenge bellow), it is unintuitive to say that we have 
conclusive factive reasons to believe that radical skeptical hypotheses are 
                                               
5 Pritchard (2016, p. 13) calls this formulation diachronic because it differs from the 
classical formulation - namely: if one knows that p and knows that p entails q, one 
knows that q. Moreover, and importantly, the diachronic version of the principle 
avoids uninteresting counterexamples that affect the classical formulation. Without 
the restriction of rationally grounded knowledge, Williamson (2000, p. 117) originally 
expressed this principle diachronically under the name of intuitive closure. 
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false. This unappealing consequence would compel us to reject the 
disjunctivist thesis or the closure principle. Since this version of the closure 
principle is at least as plausible as epistemological disjunctivism, and that 
there is no independent ground to suppose both should be abandoned 
together, epistemic immodesty would motivate a reductio of disjunctivism 
itself. Alternatively, one might argue, the fact that epistemological 
disjunctivism entails epistemic immodesty turns out to weaken 
epistemological disjunctivism in comparison with other anti-skeptical 
positions, such as epistemological contextualism, which would concede to 
the skeptic that in certain contexts we do not know that radical skeptical 
hypotheses are false (thus being “epistemically modest”). 
 We will inquire in §§4 and 5 whether epistemic immodesty really is as 
problematic as it might seem. I resist the temptation to reject disjunctivism 
based on this consequence, for I contend that a more inclusive notion of 
epistemic rationality dissolves the apparent problem of epistemic 
immodesty. For now, we must take a closer look at moderate skeptical 
possibilities and see how they fit the schema of discriminating and favoring 
epistemic support (§§2 and 3). 
 
 
2. Dream Skepticism and Phenomenological Conjunctivism 
 
If radical skeptical possibilities are reasonably unmotivated by their very 
nature because they could not be supported by particular reasons, then a 
moderate skeptical possibility could, at least in principle, be reasonably 
motivated at the expense of having a narrower scope. The dream possibility 
fits the bill because it is possible to offer reasons in its favor, although it is 
traditionally taken to be less effective than the Evil Genius and similar 
hypotheses6. As a motivation, one could say most people often dream and, 
when they are dreaming, they falsely take those dreams to be veridical 
                                               
6 Since at least Descartes’ Meditations, dream possibilities are taken to be ineffective 
against a priori knowledge. Even if this kind of knowledge does not exist, some 
general facts about our constitution – such as that we are sometimes awake and that 
most people dream, etc. – are presupposed by the dream argument and could not 
be threatened by it. 
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representations of their surroundings. If we can reasonably motivate this 
moderate skeptical possibility, then mere favoring epistemic support in 
favor of p is not enough to rule out the possibility of dreaming that p (and, 
obviously, p not being the case), for one must be able to discriminate between 
perceiving that p and dreaming that p. This is a consequence of the thesis 
that a reasonably well-motivated alternative can only be discarded if a 
subject has discriminating epistemic support against it. Put in another way, 
the idea is that, for a large class of believed propositions about the external 
world, there is the nearby possibility of entertaining these propositions in a 
dreaming state, and this modal proximity is what makes the dream 
possibility so acute. One could argue, then, in the following fashion: 
(I) If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p then S is able to achieve 
rationally grounded discriminative knowledge that she is not dreaming. 
(II) S is unable to achieve rationally grounded discriminative knowledge 
that she is not dreaming. 
:. (III) S does not have rationally grounded knowledge that p. 
(I) is based on the closure principle for rationally grounded knowledge, 
which seems to be beyond dispute. Therefore, if we want to reject the 
skeptical conclusion in (III), we must take a closer look at (II) and the 
motivation that lies behind it. The philosophical platitude that one is unable 
to achieve rationally grounded knowledge, in particular of a discriminative 
sort, that one is not dreaming is anchored in a phenomenological thesis – 
call it phenomenological conjunctivism: 
The content C of S’s waking experience is phenomenologically 
indistinguishable, from S’s point of view at any given time, from a content 
D of S’s possible dreaming experience. 
The justification for phenomenological conjunctivism is the fact that, 
when we are dreaming, we misleadingly take oneiric experiences as veridical 
representations of our surroundings, in a way that we are unable to 
distinguish between dreaming and perceiving. Therefore, in order to avoid 
the skeptical conclusion in (III), we need to undermine the 
phenomenological conjunctivist thesis, and this in turn depends on 
examining whether this fact supports phenomenological conjunctivism. 
One way to do so is to dispute the fact itself (or the way this fact is 
usually construed). This can be done by claiming that we do not believe in the 
contents of our dreams, for dreaming that p and believing that p are 
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different mental events. Sosa (2007) explores this view based on the 
distinction between events that happen in dream and events that happen while 
one dreams7. Events in dream may encompass belief-like states, but that is 
different from the beliefs one has while awake and that survive in the 
background of one’s conscience while dreaming. One could reinforce this 
distinction by arguing that believing is in principle open to rational 
evaluation, while dreaming is not. One should, after all, review one’s beliefs 
given the accessible evidences, but it seems entirely out of place to rationally 
evaluate a belief-like state that happens in a dream. 
One problem with this line of response is that it ignores what happens 
when one entertains a lucid dream, for lucid dreams do not seem to be 
completely devoid of doxastic states – indeed, it is reported that lucid 
dreamers are able to perform certain tasks, like counting time in the dream 
(LaBerge, 2000). Moreover, contrary to what Sosa claims, it is quite possible 
to believe in what happens in a dream during a waking experience: several 
times I seem to suddenly remember something during the day – say, that 
there were some fruits in the fridge – only to find out later that I had dreamt 
it. In this case, it seems that fragments of the dream played a doxastic role 
and could be rationally assessed in a waking experience. I can open the 
fridge in the morning and become genuinely surprised to find out there 
were no fruits there. Nightmares can serve as counterexamples as well: often 
when a dream takes a bad turn, one wakes up believing that so-and-so 
happened and it takes a while, and maybe a good deal of ambientation, to 
realize it had not. This suggests that a belief (or a belief-like state, if you will) 
formed in dream can transcend the dreaming state and become open to 
rational evaluation in a waking experience. If this is so, the idea of 
distinguishing beliefs from oneiric belief-like states does not seem appealing 
and the fact that we often take dreams to be veridical representations 
remains unscathed. 
There is indeed an available alternative: to question whether the fact 
about our inability to distinguish in-dreams states from veridical states lends 
                                               
7 Wittgenstein (1969) proposes a similar strategy: ‘The argument “I may be 
dreaming” is senseless for this reason: if I am dreaming, this remark is being 
dreamed as well - and indeed it is also being dreaming that these words have any 
meaning’ (§383). See also §676. 
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the necessary support for phenomenological conjunctivism. Remember that 
phenomenological conjunctivism is a general thesis about the 
indistinguishability of a waking content C, from S’s point of view at any given 
time, from a content D of a possible dreaming experience. The fact that’s 
under scrutiny, however, is that we cannot discriminate dream from reality 
in dream. I submit it is a non-sequitur to arrive at the general thesis from this 
fact, for it is plainly possible to discriminate waking experience from 
dreaming experience while awake. There is a grain of truth on asking for 
someone to pinch you to see whether you are dreaming (anecdotal as it may 
be), for waking experience is different from dreaming experience in a 
substantial way8. This point has been made in a slightly different tune by a 
few philosophers. Austin’s enlightening thoughts on the matter deserve to 
be quoted at some length: 
 
[...] We have the phrase ‘a dream-like quality’. Some waking 
experiences are said to have this dream-like quality, and some artists 
and writers occasionally try to impart it, usually with scant success, to 
their works. But of course, if the fact [that ‘delusive and veridical 
experiences’ are not ‘qualitatively different’] here alleged were a fact, 
the phrase would be perfectly meaningless, because applicable to 
everything. If dreams were not ‘qualitatively’ different from waking 
experience, then every waking experience would be like a dream; the 
dream-like quality would be, not difficult to capture, but impossible 
to avoid. (Austin, 1962, pp. 48-49). 
 
Similarly, and more to the point, here is Rödl: 
 
From the fact that, when I am fooled, I do not know that I am, it 
does not follow that, when I am not fooled, I do not know that I am 
not. When I know that p as I perceive it to be the case, then I know 
                                               
8 Sosa intends to defend this conclusion by the distinction we mentioned above. 
Therefore, Sosa and I share the same conclusion, but I offer a different rationale. 
Here is his view on the matter: ‘What enables us to distinguish the two content-
identical states is just the fact that in the dream state we do not affirm anything—
not that we are  veridically perceiving an external world, nor that we are not—
whereas in waking life we do knowingly perceive our surroundings. This by our 
lights suffices to make the two states distinguishable.’ (Sosa, 2007, pp. 18-19). 
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that I perceive that p. Thus I am in a position to distinguish my 
situation from any possible situation in which I would be fooled, for, 
in any such situation, I would not perceive that p, while in the given 
situation I do. (Rödl, 2007, p. 158) 
 
If we hold on to the idea that waking experience is fundamentally 
different from dreaming experience, then we are straightforwardly 
committed to the rejection of phenomenological conjunctivism: it is not the 
case that waking and dreaming experiences share the same phenomenology 
and are, therefore, indistinguishable. So it seems that, in order to deal with 
dream skepticism, we have to think of experience in terms of 
phenomenological disjunctivism. However, this result is dialectically 
insufficient to reject the premise on the skeptical argument that says it is 
humanly impossible to achieve rationally grounded discriminative 
knowledge that one is not dreaming, because we still need a reasonable 
explanation of how can we distinguish reality from dreaming. What exactly is 
present in a case and absent in the other?  
 
 
3. Actionism and Phenomenological Disjunctivism 
 
3.1. Motivations and Relevance 
 
Recently Alva Noë proposed an independently motivated account of 
perceptual consciousness – what he called enactive approach (2004) and 
actionism (2012) – which offers a plausible rationale for phenomenological 
disjunctivism9. The basic tenet of this view is that conscious perception is an 
activity performed by the exercise of sensorimotor abilities. This means that 
the content of one’s conscious perception is constituted by the practical way 
one can engage with the world. 
Actionism is a phenomenological account that aims to do justice to our 
perceptual experience. Its main motivation is to explain two related facts 
                                               
9 For a classical work on the subject of embodied mind, see Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch (1991). As a critique of the philosophical consequences Noë draws from the 
experiments we mention bellow, see Prinz (2009). It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to present an extensive defense of this view. 
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about our encounter with objects without appealing to representations as 
internal models of the world: first, the fact that perception is a perspectival 
event but is also about the objects themselves, in a sense regardless of the 
perceiver’s point of view. For instance, as I look at a plate on the table, it 
seems to be oval or oblong from my current perspective, but I also perceive 
it as being round. In the second place, actionism explains the fact that 
objects present themselves as facets but also as wholes: as I look at the 
bookshelf in front of me, I see aspects of books, mostly their covers, but it 
is also plausible to say I am perceiving the books, not just slices of books. 
Both facts of our phenomenology are explained by the appeal to 
sensorimotor knowledge: I perceive the plate as round because I dispose of 
the practical knowledge to move and engage with the different aspects of it 
that unfold in my experience, and this practical knowledge allows me to 
grasp what stays constant when I perceive the plate, its roundness, and what 
shifts when I move around, its look or appearance. That I perceive objects 
in their entirety despite seeing only facets of them is explained by the virtual 
accessibility provided by my sensorimotor abilities to navigate in the 
environment: I perceive books and not only slices of their covers because I 
have the know-how to assume different perspectives and integrate them in a 
dynamic experience10.  
Actionism is also in tune with empirical findings: cases of what Noë calls 
experiential blindness count as direct support in its favor (2004, pp. 8-11). 
Those cases are exemplified by experiments where a subject wears glasses 
with inverted lenses, which cause left and right (or up and down) to be 
switched in her visual field. The subjects in these experiments at first fail to 
integrate their perceptual stimuli and experience a period of confusion 
(Stratton 1897, Kohler 1951 and Taylor 1962). In a second stage, they slowly 
relearn how to operate with these stimuli and come to entertain episodes of 
conscious perception as if they were not wearing inverted lenses. Finally, 
when the lenses are removed, they undergo a period of confusion similar to 
                                               
10 Noë also aims to explain our perception of colors through actionism (Cf. Noë, 
2004, chapter 4): although surfaces hardly are uniformly colored, we are perfectly 
able to distinguish the actual shade of a surface from the variations caused by the 
way light reflects on it on different angles.  
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the one at the first stage and have to relearn once again how to operate with 
their perceptual stimuli. The best explication of what happens in these cases 
is that the subject is partially blind due to the ‘inability to integrate sensory 
stimulation with patterns of movement and thought’ (Noë 2004, p. 4), 
which is exactly what actionism predicts. 
As for indirect support, competing views fail to explain cases of change 
blindness, where an individual does not consciously perceive changes that 
happen in her perceptual field (see Noë 2004, pp. 51-54, idem 2012, p. 93). 
This argument depends on the uncontentious premise that the environment 
we inhabit is heavily detailed. If our perception were pictorial, in the sense 
that it would capture all the details available in a single ‘mental scene’, then 
changes in the details of the environment would cause changes in 
perception. But this is not what happens. Experiments show we are prone 
to fail to perceive significant changes within our perceptual field if our 
attention is focused elsewhere (O’Reagan et al. 2000). Therefore, the 
phenomenon of change blindness shows that ‘we don’t make use of detailed 
internal models of the scene.’ (Noë 2004, p. 52). In order to entertain states 
of conscious perception, then, we have to navigate through the 
environment, and this can only be done by the exercise of our sensorimotor 
abilities: from saccades to movements of the whole body. 
According to Noë’s actionism, perceptual consciousness is an embodied 
achievement – it necessarily involves an interaction with the environment, as 
the epistemological disjunctivist claims (see Noë 2012, pp. 63-67 for this 
same point) – and, more importantly, it requires the effective exercise of 
certain abilities that are not strictly intellectual, such as the ability to move 
one’s own body in order to access what is available11. Here is Noë on the 
matter: 
                                               
11 As Noë himself notices (2012, p. 69), the view bears some resemblance to 
conceptualism about perceptual experience, because experience is not given, instead 
it is mediated by one’s understanding - in this case, practical understanding. Practical 
understanding or sensorimotor abilities would play a role analogous to the one 
played by concepts in the conceptualist view. Unless we are willing to stretch the 
very idea of conceptual capacities in order encompass sensorimotor abilities (which 
indeed was Noë’s (2004) view on the matter), actionism does not amount to 
conceptualism. Note that an actionist approach to conceptual content seems to 
imply the rejection of Evans’ Generality Constraint (Evans 1984, p. 75), according 
16 Giovanni Rolla 
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[...] Conscious reference is, in general, an achievement of the 
understanding. To see something – that is, for something to show up 
for one in conscious visual experience – or to refer in thought to 
something – that is, for it to show up in one’s conscious thoughts – 
is a matter of skillful access to the thing. [...] Conscious reference is a 
relation between a skillful person and a really existing thing. Where 
there is no really existing thing there can be no access or genuine 
availability; at most there can be the illusion of such. But the mere 
existence of the intentional object is not sufficient to guarantee that 
our thought or experience can involve it; for thought or experience 
to involve the object, the perceiver must be comprehending. (Noë, 
2012, p. 27) 
 
 The view that our experience is constituted by our sensorimotor 
abilities to access the world is directly relevant to our present puzzle, 
because it offers a plausible explanation of the difference in kind between 
waking and dreaming experiences – thus justifying phenomenological 
disjunctivism. The idea here is that our dreaming experiences are not the 
result of a successful exercise of our sensorimotor abilities (nevertheless it is 
quite plausible that a different set of abilities is necessary for dreaming, 
which would explain the possibility of lucid dreaming and the fact that some 
people do not dream). This in turn explains why our experience is richer and 
significantly more consistent in actual perception: because we can navigate 
through our environment and access its details, while in dreaming there is 
no movement and practical understanding involved12. So (II) on the 
                                                                                                          
to which an individual possessing conceptual capacities would be capable of 
generating an infinite number of thoughts. The reason for the rejection of the 
Generality Constraint is that, on the actionist view, the exercise of an individual’s 
abilities are constrained by the environment she inhabits and could not be 
reproducible infinitely. 
12 Noë, 2004, p. 214 draws a similar conclusion. He is not worried with dream 
skepticism in particular (indeed, he explicitly sets aside the question), but rather with 
answering the internalist objection that, if sensorimotor abilities were necessary for 
perception, how could we explain dream states? The common ground here is of 
course the fact that there is no sensorimotor abilities involved in dreaming 
experiences - and Noë’s reply consists in explaining that waking and dreaming 
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skeptical argument above is false, and the argument from (I)-(III) is not 
solid. Moreover, if epistemological disjunctivism is a stronger anti-skeptical 
thesis when understood also in terms of a variation of phenomenological 
disjunctivism, in this case, the one supported by actionism; and if both 
actionism and disjunctivism consistently explain the differences between 
perceptual states and defective states – actionism through a 
phenomenological route and disjunctivism through an epistemological one – 
then the explanation of these differences offered by the combination of the 
two accounts is more robust than the one offered by epistemological 
disjunctivism or by actionism separately 
In the next two sections, I intend to show that if one is willing to accept 
actionism as the motivation for phenomenological disjunctivism in order to 
solve the skeptical puzzle based on the dream possibility, then epistemic 
immodesty – the apparently problematic consequence of epistemological 
disjunctivism and closure – is not really problematic at all, given a more 
inclusive notion of rationality suggested by an actionist view. But first we 
will take a closer look on what means to take actionism as an anti-skeptical 
thesis. 
 
3.2. Actionism as an Anti-Skeptical Thesis 
 
 One could object that actionism is unable to properly motivate a 
response to the dream skeptical argument because it is an empirical thesis. 
This is a controversial claim, for actionism is intended to be an account of 
our perceptual experience – and, although it does enjoy empirical support 
(both direct and indirect), it is unclear whether describing our perceptual 
experience by appealing to our bodily skills is question-begging. After all, 
actionism seems to be an accurate account because we are embodied 
creatures, and supposing from the beginning that the only fitting kind of 
answer to the skeptic has to dispense our bodies and to depend exclusively 
on internal representations is to gratuitously shift the burden of the proof.  
However, in order to answer this objection, we can concede that 
actionism is empirically motivated, but this does not undermine our overall 
                                                                                                          
experiences are radically different precisely because sensorimotor skills are absent in 
dreaming states. 
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strategy. As said in §1, we are assuming the correctness of epistemological 
disjunctivism and trying to avoid construing the consequence that we can 
have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical 
hypotheses as a case of epistemic immodesty. The core disjunctivist idea is 
that perception yields a factive rational basis for believing and that non-
perceptual states do not have the same epistemic status as perception. This 
allows us to block the skeptical argument according to which we are not 
entitled to rely on our perceptual states, because they would have the same 
epistemic status as deceptive states, and thus would not yield knowledge. So 
if epistemological disjunctivism is correct, we are entitled to take our 
perceptual states as sources of knowledge if we find ourselves in good 
epistemic circumstances. Among those perceptual states are the ones that 
support actionism, such as observations of our own experience and the 
relation it holds with our sensorimotor abilities and the empirical evidence 
in support of actionism. 
There is a condition, however, that must be satisfied for epistemological 
disjunctivism to allow us to rely on an empirically based claim, viz.: that 
there are no reasonably well-motivated possibilities of mistake. If any such 
possibility is available, we do not find ourselves in good epistemic 
circumstances and should withhold our judgements concerning our 
perceptual states. Here one might take the skeptic’s point as fundamental 
and argue that, given the dream possibility, we have to prove beforehand 
that we can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that we are not 
dreaming. This strategy could be properly said to be a refutation of the 
skeptical argument, and it does not seem like it can be done with anything 
less than a transcendental argument. I suggest a more cautious stance: there 
is no prior reason to suppose that the skeptic’s point is more fundamental 
than common sense. Therefore, instead of refuting the skeptic, we aim to 
explain what is wrong with the skeptical argument by appealing to a 
commonsensical view according to which we have plenty of knowledge. On 
this strategy, skeptical arguments are taken to be pseudo-paradoxes, for they 
are constituted by prima facie plausible premises which entail unacceptable 
consequences. The strategy deployed here consists in explaining why a 
premise of the skeptical argument is merely apparently plausible, but is 
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actually misleading and should be rejected13. This process is 
epistemologically relevant not only because it shows where exactly the 
skeptical argument goes astray, but also because it exposes features of our 
cognition that, if ignored, lead to unappealing consequences. Specifically in 
the case of the dream skeptical argument, we saw in §§2 and 3.1 that the 
premise (II), according to which one cannot acquire rationally grounded 
discriminative knowledge that one is not dreaming, is not only unjustified 
but also arguably false.  
 
 
4. Embodied Rationality 
 
Recall that epistemological disjunctivism is the thesis that perception is a 
rational factive basis for holding beliefs about the external world. If I know 
perceptually that p, and if the rational basis for my perceptual belief does 
transfer across the known entailment that I am not a brain in a vat, then I 
am able to acquire the rationally grounded knowledge that I am not a brain 
in a vat. This result is what Pritchard calls epistemic immodesty, and it does 
seem to be too strong of a consequence. This is so because usually when 
talking about rationality – hence about rationally grounded knowledge – 
philosophers have in mind something as the possession of reasons that 
entail or non-deductively support the target belief. Ideally, those reasons can 
be articulated and brought about by a rational individual with the relevant 
conceptual skills when he or she is questioned. Call this the narrow conception 
of rationality, because it demands that the individual whose rationality we are 
assessing possesses a set of sophisticated cognitive skills. It follows that 
small children and non–human animals are a-rational for they do not fit this 
view normative framework. 
It is something along these lines that Pritchard has in mind when he says 
that disjunctivism, as a philosophical position, enables us to have rationally 
grounded knowledge of mundane propositions (although he is not explicit 
about it). And this would be, indeed, one of the biggest gains of assuming a 
                                               
13 This is why the specific strategy I endorse is close to the one Pritchard calls 
‘undercutting’ anti-skeptical strategy (Pritchard, 2012), for it aims not to respond to 
the skeptic, but to diagnose what is wrong with her argument. 
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disjunctivist position: the fact that one perceives that p is the rational source 
of one’s belief that p, which entails p in appropriate conditions. There is 
nothing mysterious in citing this fact as the rational source of belief 
formation: ‘I know because I see it’. However, on this view of rationality, it 
certainly sounds odd to say that any perceived fact is a rational basis for 
denying a radical skeptical hypothesis, given that individuals in skeptical 
scenarios and in non-skeptical cases (like the real world) would seem to 
share the same phenomenological states. However, actionism enables us to 
reject this premise, for individuals in skeptical scenarios – as these are 
traditionally conceived – trivially do not enact their perceptual content. A brain in a 
vat has no body to exercise its sensorimotor abilities and thus lacks 
perceptual experiences altogether – as a radical disjunctivist would certainly 
predict. But what does this tell us about rationality? The view I am 
proposing here is that to perceive that p is a rational basis of belief 
formation not because we can cite the fact that p as the source and 
justification of the relevant belief, but because to perceive that p is a form of 
achievement, particularly, an embodied achievement. It is with this account of 
rational cognition as achievement in mind that I suggest the following 
general definition of rationality, call it embodied rationality thesis:  
S is a rational agent iff S is able to achieve a specific goal through the 
exercise of the relevant abilities in suitable conditions.  
A perceptually conscious agent is rational, according to this view, 
because she achieves perceptual content (and forms beliefs correspondingly) 
by exercising her sensorimotor abilities in her interaction with the 
environment. Note that the ability to achieve a specific goal is dispositional 
and it implies some sort of stability, so it has to cover a large class of cases, 
for rational procedures are not compatible with lucky achievements. One 
can cash out this notion in modal terms: an agent is rational in achieving a 
specific goal if she achieves the same goal in most or all nearby possible 
worlds wherein she exercises the same abilities with the same end. Secondly, 
and relatedly, the notion of ‘relevant ability’ is intentionally vague, for the 
capacity to overcome shortcomings in which the specific abilities are not 
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available (or could not be properly exercised) is quite intuitively a distinctive 
aspect of rational individuals14. 
The embodied rationality thesis is broader than the narrow notion 
mentioned above for two reasons. Firstly, it covers paradigmatic cases both 
of epistemic and of practical rationality. Note that if perception 
fundamentally depends on practical understanding, then the distinction 
between practical and epistemic rationality becomes somewhat blurred 
when it comes to perception as a source of rationally grounded knowledge15. 
Therefore, it is an advantage of the embodied view of rationality that it does 
not offer a clear cut between epistemic and practical rationality. Secondly, it 
is consistent with the idea, which is central to the narrow notion, that if a 
belief has some sort of appropriate propositional support, it is rationally held. For 
deductive and non-deductive justification certainly are cases of achievement 
of specific goals (deductively demonstrated belief or inductively justified 
belief16) through the exercise of the relevant abilities (inferential abilities, 
recognition of inferential patterns, sensitivity to reason and to new 
evidences) in suitable conditions (Gettier-style cases and skeptical scenarios 
aside). What the embodied rationality thesis explicitly rejects is the 
conditional that, if a belief is rationally held, then it enjoys some sort of appropriate 
propositional support. The reason for that is that now we can appreciate other 
forms of rationality in a more inclusive normative view, for non-human 
animals and small children are also able to successfully engage with their 
environment, in different levels and with different abilities (something that 
is corroborated by an evolutionary view) and form beliefs correspondingly17. 
                                               
14 Variety and creativity in problem-solving strategies is fundamental for most 
conceptions of intelligence as well - see Cianciolo & Sternberg (2004), mainly 
Sternberg’s notion of successful intelligence (1995) -, plausible because intelligence 
and rationality are closely related. 
15 Note that the appeal to an actionist theory of perceptual knowledge is not 
sufficient to entail that all knowledge-that is a kind of knowledge-how (or depends 
on practical understanding) - such as the view defended by Hetherington (2011).  
16 For simplicity, I am supposing here that abductive inferences are a subclass of 
inductive inferences.  
17 Of course, that is not to say that humans and non-human animals share the same 
basic form of access to the world. On the contrary, the view we are advocating here 
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Now, we distinguished two conditionals, both of which are central to the 
narrow notion of rationality. One is that if a belief has some sort of appropriate 
propositional support, it is rationally held – call this the inclusivist conditional – 
and the other one is if a belief is rationally held, then it enjoys some sort of appropriate 
propositional support – call this the exclusivist conditional. What could be the 
rationales behind both conditionals? 
Certainly the idea behind the inclusivist conditional is that of truth-
conduciveness, for deductively valid inferences are truth preserving and 
inductively good inferences enhance the chances of its target belief being 
true. But note that being true is not the main aspect of the rationale for the 
inclusivist conditional, for a belief can be accidentally true and thus fail to 
qualify as rationally held belief. What is important here is the idea of achieving 
true beliefs through certain methods (specifically, in this case, deductive and 
non-deductive reasoning), and this is why the inclusivist conditional is 
contemplated by the embodied notion of rationality.  
As for the exclusivist conditional, its rationale seems to rest in a 
confusion between, on the one hand, the act of making explicit the rational 
support a belief might have and, on the other, the rational status an agent 
might have independently of this act. This confusion arises in a similar 
manner when the topic is epistemic justification, as noticed by Alston (1988) 
– for focusing on our practices of giving reasons and responding to 
challenges inevitably leads us to the idea that only beliefs justify other 
beliefs. This is so because, if we partake in the dialogical game of giving and 
demanding justifications, we have to explicitly articulate them as 
propositions which we endorse. Similarly, we can focus on whether a 
propositional attitude is rational, given an available procedure to arrive at 
that attitude or we can focus on whether an individual is rational in having 
that attitude, given certain behavior that is explanatory of her attitude. The 
former forces a constraint of propositionality upon our view of rationality – 
                                                                                                          
ensures that individuals possessing different abilities engage with the world 
differently, and thus instantiate different forms of rationality. How complex an 
individual’s abilities are and how rich is her conceptual scheme are elements that 
transform the rationality she instantiates on her engagement with the world - this is 
why this view represents a transformative conception of rationality, as presented by Boyle 
(forthcoming). 
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hence the narrow notion – while the later allows us to say that an individual 
is rational by achieving certain goals through specific abilities. I find no 
independent reason to choose the first view, which entails the exclusivist 
conditional, instead of the second – unless one is supposing from the start 
that any broad notion of rationality is false. 
 
 
5. Epistemic Immodesty  
 
Recall that epistemic immodesty – the idea that one can acquire 
rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a skeptical scenario – is a 
seemingly unappealing consequence of epistemological disjunctivism 
conjoined with the closure principle for rationally grounded knowledge. The 
distinction between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds does not 
ease the discomfort, for even the possibility of acquiring non-discriminative 
rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a skeptical scenario seems 
to be too strong. Pritchard’s attempt to solve this puzzle is inspired by some 
of Wittgenstein’s (1969) remarks on our epistemic practices, according to 
which all rational evaluations are local, viz., some propositions cannot be 
assessed in a rational inquiry. More to the point, according to Pritchard we 
cannot rationally evaluate the denials of skeptical hypotheses, because 
propositions, like ‘I am not a brain in a vat’, codify or express our hinge 
commitments, which are ‘visceral commitments on our part, commitments that 
must be in place in order to create the rational arena in which rational 
evaluations function’ (Pritchard, 2016, p. 175). If this is the case, then hinge 
commitments cannot constitute (or be translated to, or be codified by) 
beliefs, for beliefs are essentially open to rational evaluation. A fortiori, they 
cannot qualify as knowledgeable propositions18. On this view, one cannot 
even form the belief (let alone the knowledge-apt belief) that one is not a 
brain in a vat on the ground that one perceives something to be the case, 
even if one’s perception is factive and rationally grounded. The closure 
                                               
18 Pritchard is careful to distinguish the view that hinge commitments cannot 
constitute (or be translated to, or be codified by) beliefs from the stronger thesis 
that hinge commitments are not propositional. One contender of the later view is 
Moyal-Sharrock (2004).  
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principle for rationally grounded knowledge, then, would not apply to this 
sort of case. 
Aside of creating an exception to the relevant closure principle, what 
may sound puzzling about Pritchard’s strategy is that it seems entirely 
possible to believe that one is not a victim in a skeptical scenario. In order 
to accommodate this appearance, Pritchard has to deny that the 
phenomenology of our mental states is a privileged way of determining their 
nature. He writes:  
 
This [hinge] commitment may feel like belief to the person 
concerned, in that its phenomenology may be identical to other, 
more mundane, beliefs that the subject holds. But the import of this 
point is moot once we remember that the phenomenology of a 
propositional attitude does not suffice to determine what 
propositional attitude is in play (Pritchard, 2016, p. 102).  
 
Pritchard then offers the example of wishful thinking as a justification 
for the claim that the phenomenology of our mental states is not a reliable 
indicator of their nature. Note, however, that wishful thinking is not a 
standard case, unlike believing, which would explain why an individual who 
thinks wishfully has a propensity to fail to identify the nature of her mental 
state. Moreover, Pritchard is here advocating some sort of 
phenomenological conjunctivism, which would bring us back to dream 
skepticism (in particular, our solution to the dream skeptical argument, 
which consists in rejecting II, would not be available). The advantage of the 
embodied notion of rationality on this matter is that it offers a less onerous 
solution to the apparent problem of epistemic immodesty – and it is also 
Wittgensteinian in spirit (although I am not interested in presenting a 
faithful exegesis here).  
The idea is that the attitudes concerning the propositions that codify our 
hinge commitments – such as ‘here is a hand’ – do not come for free. They 
are not the goal of a rational evaluation, in the sense that they could not 
enjoy rational support narrowly conceived (at least in most normal 
circumstances). But they are achieved by the way we engage with the world, 
which is explained by our sensorimotor abilities. Our attitudes concerning 
these propositions then, on the light of the embodied rationality thesis, are 
rational. The same applies to the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses: we 
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form the beliefs in the denials of radical skeptical possibilities based on the 
successful exercise of our sensorimotor abilities: it is because we are 
successfully interacting with the world that we believe we are not brains in 
vats for instance. Since beliefs like these are achieved through the exercise 
of our relevant abilities in suitable conditions, we are rational in believing 
that we are not victims in skeptical scenarios. Furthermore, given 
epistemological disjunctivism, our perception in good circumstances is 
factive – it follows that the beliefs in the denials of radical skeptical 
hypotheses constitute rationally grounded knowledge.19 
This point is on a par with some of Wittgenstein’s (1969) passages that 
show a struggle with the finding that rational evaluations are dependent 
upon something that is not open to rational evaluation itself, namely our 
most fundamental practices: 
 
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;-
but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as 
true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which 
lies at the bottom of the language-game. (§204, my emphasis) 
  
[...] As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the 
end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of 
acting. (§110, my emphasis).20 
 
That our epistemic practices of ‘giving grounds’ are based on ‘an 
ungrounded way of acting’ is a way of expressing the locality of our rational 
evaluations, for we cannot adduce reasons in support of our most 
fundamental presuppositions, our hinge commitments. But it does not 
follow from this fact that ‘our acting’ is irrational, not as long as one 
conceives of rationality as something embodied. Epistemic immodesty, 
then, is not a problem on this view because we cannot but act the way we 
do, viz., by engaging with the world through the cognitive apparatus we are 
endowed with. This consequence is best understood not as a matter of 
                                               
19 Note that the claim I am advancing here is bolder than the idea that we are 
pragmatically justified in accepting that we are not victims in skeptical scenarios. 
For this view, see Wright (2004). 
20 See also §§148, 232 and 342. 
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immodesty, but as a depiction of our constitution as cognitive agents. This is 
also obliquely contemplated by Wittgenstein for, although it is a contingent 
matter which hinge commitments we hold fast to in order for our rational 
evaluations to be possible, that some need to stay put is not contingent21:  
 
But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate 
everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest with the 
assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put 
(§343)22. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
  
The suggestion that rationality is not something purely intellectual and 
unconstrained by our worldly actions arises naturally from the sort of 
actionist account of perception I proposed as a solution to the dream 
argument. This view then allows us to say that epistemic immodesty is not a 
problematic consequence of epistemological disjunctivism and closure for 
rationally grounded knowledge, because it is not problematic at all. But it 
also has a consequence that seems to be counterintuitive or 
straightforwardly unacceptable: individuals in skeptical scenarios do not 
engage with the world – by the most intuitive way to construe such 
scenarios – and could not, therefore, be said to be rational if we accept the 
embodied view of rationality. They achieve nothing, they fail systematically. 
Nonetheless, it seems that we can imagine the victims in skeptical scenarios 
as being epistemically responsible and avoiding inferential pitfalls – which is 
something cardinal to any intuitive notion of rationality. How can the view 
defended here deal with this objection? This is a problem to be addressed in 
the future. 
 
                                               
21 Wittgenstein addresses the fact that there is not sharp and definitive distinction 
between our hinge commitments and the rest of our rational evaluations with the 
riverbed metaphor (§§96-99). 
22 See also §§152 and 235. 
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